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SUPREME COURT- STATE OF NEW YORK
DUTCHESS COUNTY
Present:
Hon. MARIA G. ROSA
Justice.

DECISION, ORDER
AND JUDGMENT .

Petitioner,
-against-

Index No: 2789/15

TINA M. STANFORD, Chair of the New York
State Parole Board,
Respondent.

The following papers were read and considered on this Article 78 petition.
NOTICE OF PETITION
PETITION
EXHIBITS A-F
ANSWER AND RETURN

EXHIBITS 1-9
Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 to review a determination
of the Board of Parole denying his request for parole release. In 1976 petitioner was convicted after
a jury trial of murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree, burglary in the second
degree, grand larceny in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and
other lesser offenses. Judgment was reversed on appeal, but in 1981 he was again convicted of the
same offenses and sentenced to an aggregate term of25 years to life. The convictions stemmed from
the petitioner's participation in a burglary during which he shot and killed a police officer. Petitioner
first became eligible for parole release in June 2000. On December 9, 2014 he appeared before the
parole board for his eighth appearance. He was 68 years old and had been incarcerated nearly 40
years for his offenses of conviction, almost 15 years beyond the controlling minimum term of his
indefinite sentence.
Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c), the New York State Board of Parole is required to
consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released to parole.
See Matter of Miller v. NYS Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690 (2"d Dept. 2010). The parole board must
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also consider whether "there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for
the law." 9 NYCRR 8002.1. A parole board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory
factor, nor is it required specifically to articulate every factor considered. See Matter of Huntley v.
Evans, 77 AD3d 945 (2"d Dept. 2010). It is further permitted to place a greater emphasis on the
gravity of offense committed. See Matter of Serrano v. Alexander, 70 AD3d 1099, 1100 (3"' Dept.
2010). However, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, a parole board may not deny release
solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense. Huntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d at 94 7; King v.
New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (l" Dept. 1993). Moreover, while the board need
not consider each guideline separately and has broad discretion to consider the importance of each
factor, the board must still consider the guidelines. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a). Finally, the board
must inform the inmate in writing of the factors and reasons for denial of parole and"[s ]uch reasons
shall be given in detail and not in conclusoryterms." Executive Law §259-i(2)(a); Malone v. Evans,
83 .AD3d 719 (2"d Dept. 2011 ). A determination by a parole board whether or not to grant parole is ·
discretionary, and if made in accordance with the relevant statutory factors, is not subject to judicial
review absent "a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety." Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd.
of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980).
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended in 2011 to require the board to establish new
procedures to use in making parole determinations. The statutory amendment was intended to have
parole boards focus on an applicant's rehabilitation and future rather than giving undue weight to
the crime of conviction and the inmate's pre-incarceration behavior. To assist the members of the
board in taking this approach when making parole determinations, the amendment required the
establishment of written guidelines incorporating risk and needs principles to measure an inmate's
rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release. See Ramirez v. Evans, 118 AD3d 707 (2"d
Dept. 2014). In response, the board of parole adopted the COMPAS (Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction) assessment tool. A COMPAS assessment was
prepared in connection with petitioner's December 9, 2014 appearance before the parole board.
At petitioner's parole hearing, the board questioned him about his crimes of conviction,
length of incarceration, acceptance of responsibility and remorse for his offenses, institutional
achievements and prospects for employment and housing upon release. Petitioner discussed with the
board that he began developing a victim's advocacy program in 1983, and that in 1997 he started the
first victim awareness program in Green Haven Correctional Facility in honor of the police officer
he had killed. The board acknowledged that petitioner had received a Bachelor of Science in
Commerce from Niagra University in 1987 and Associate Degrees in Science and Arts from the
Clinton Community College in 1979. The board further noted petitioner's achievements including
adult peer counseling, pre-release counseling, working as a typist, doing legal research, welding,
substance abuse program participation and as an apprentice baker. Petitioner received in excess of
60 letters of recommendation for release on his behalf including letters from individuals working in
law enforcement. The board commented that petitioner's disciplinary record of no infractions for a
34 year period was remarkable. The COMPAS risk assessment designated petitioner as a low risk
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for felony violence, arrest or absconding. Following the hearing, the board issued a decision denying
parole. The decision recognized that the offenses of conviction were petitioner's only felonies of
record, that his institutional programming indicated progress and achievement, that he had a clean
disciplinary record and that there was significant community support for his release. The decision
also noted "significant community opposition" to his release. Stating that the requisite statutory
factors had been considered including petitioner's risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts and
his needs for successful community re-entry, the board denied release. The stated reason was that
it would not be compatible with the welfare of society at large and would depreciate the seriousness
of the instant offenses and undermine respect for the law.
The record before the court reveals that the parole board considered the statutory factors set
forth in Executive Law §259-i. However, the final determination to deny parole release and its
conclusory statement that petitioner's release would not be compatible with the welfare of society
and would depreciate the seriousness of his crimes of conviction is not supported by an application
of )he factual record to the statutory factors. Petitioner had no felony record at the time of his
conviction, unquestionably exhibited acceptance of responsibility and remorse for his actions, had
an exemplary record of institutional achievements, had no institutional infractions for over 35 years
and his CO"MPAS assessment indicated he was a low risk forre-arrest or criminal involvement upon
release. It found substance abuse or personality disorders to be unlikely and that he has family
support and financial prospects upon release.
The court is cognizant that it is not its function to substitute its own judgment for that of a
parole board. See generally, Matter of Cowan v. Kern. 41NY2d591 (1977). However, where an
administration agency reaches a conclusion entirely unsupported by the factual record before it, a
rational basis for the determination does not exist. It is clear to this court that the parole board's
determination was based exclusively on the severity of petitioner's offense. A parole board is not
entitled to exclusively rely on the severity of an offense to deny parole, as such a determination
contravenes the discretionary scheme mandated by statute and constitutes an unauthorized resentencing of the defendant. See Matter of King v. NYS Division of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 (1" Dept.
1993 ). The parole board is not allowed to employ its own penal philosophy in making determinations
as such factor is in encompassed within Executive Law §259-i(2)(c). To the extent that the board's
determination here is based upon letters of community opposition, respondent has failed to
demonstrate a rational basis for the challenged determination. Neither the letters nor a description
of their content is before this court. Petitioner suggested at his parole hearing that the letters were
written from police benevolent association groups who did not know the victim or petitioner and
have no first-hand knowledge of the facts underlying his conviction. Accordingly, any such letters
would reflect opposition to release based on penal philosophy; namely that individuals convicted of
killing a police officer should never obtain parole release. This is not law and members of the parole
board are not permitted to apply their own penal philosophy in determining whether release is
appropriate. Thus, it is beyond cavil that the parole board may not deny parole based solely on letters
from unknown third parties expressing their penal philosophies. Finding no rational support in the
record before this court for respondent's determination, it is hereby
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ORDERED that the board's determination dated December 15, 2014 denying petitioner
parole release is vacated and the matter is remanded to the parole board to make a de nova
determination on petitioner's request for parole release. It is further
ORDERED that none of the individual members on the parole board that rendered that
challenged determination shall participate in the parole hearing to be held upon remand.
This constitutes the decision, order and judgment of this court.
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Dated: October
,2015
Poughkeepsie, New York

~

MARIA G. ROSA, J.S.C.
Kindlon Shanks & Associates
Kathy Manley, Esq.
74 Chapel Street
Albany NY 12207
State of New York
Office of the Attorney General
Attn: J. Gardner Ryan, Asst. Attorney General
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 40 I
Poughkeepsie NY 12601-3157

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 671.5, please be advised that you have the right to appeal, or to apply for
permission to appeal, this order to the Appellate Division. Your notice of appeal must be filed at the
Dutchess County Clerk's Office, 22 Market Street, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601. Upon proof
of your financial inability to retain counsel and pay the cost and expenses of the appeal, you have
the right to apply to the appellate court for assignment of counsel and leave to prosecute the appeal
as a poor person. CPLR Section 5513 provides that an appeal may be taken, or motion for
permission to appeal may be made, within thirty (30) days after the entry and service of any order
or judgment from which the appeal is taken, or sought to be taken, and written notice of its entry.
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